IEEE AES Systems Magazine , February 1998.

The Realism of FAA Reliability-Safety Requirements and Alternatives

MICHAEL PECHT
CALCE Electronic Packaging Research Center
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742

JULIEN BOULLIE
AEROSPATIALE
LOUIS BLERIOT Corporate Research Center
DCR/BE
12, rue Pasteur
92152 Suresnes Cedex
FRANCE

EDWARD HAKIM
Army Research Laboratory
AMSRL-SE-RD
Fort Monmouth , NJ, 07703

ARIDAMAN K. JAIN
Bell Labs Innovations for Lucent Technologies
101 Crawfords Corner Road
Holmdel, NJ 07733

MARGARET JACKSON
Northrop Grumman Corp.
1745A West Nursery Road, MS S-33
Linthicum, MD 21090

IAN KNOWLES
Ministry of Defence
Walnut 2b, MOD Abbey Wood #68, PO Box 702
Bristol, BS 12 7DU
UK

RICK SCHROEDER
Rockwell International
Communications Systems Division
3200 East Renner Road, MS 462-290
Richardson TX 75082-2402

ALAN D. STRANGE
Reliability Manager
British Aerospace Military Aircraft and
Aerostructure Ltd.
Warton, Preston
UK

JOHN WYLER
Smiths Industries
255 Great Valley Parkway
Malvern, PA 19355
 

ABSTRACT:

As avionics systems become more complex, realistic qualification requirements for the flight-critical systems become more important, but more difficult to define. Requirements developed to establish acceptable levels of performance must be verifiable if they are to have any meaning. This article shows that both the current FAA requirements of flight-critical systems and the FAA recommended methods for probabilistic assessment are flawed, and result in "required" safety assessments which are misleading. Alternatives are then explored.

Complete article is available to CALCE Consortium Members.

© IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.



[Home Page][Articles Page]