CALCE Electronic Packaging Research Center
University of Maryland
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LOUIS BLERIOT Corporate Research Center
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Army Research Laboratory
Fort Monmouth , NJ, 07703
ARIDAMAN K. JAIN
Bell Labs Innovations for Lucent Technologies
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Holmdel, NJ 07733
Northrop Grumman Corp.
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Linthicum, MD 21090
Ministry of Defence
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Bristol, BS 12 7DU
Communications Systems Division
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Richardson TX 75082-2402
ALAN D. STRANGE
British Aerospace Military Aircraft and
255 Great Valley Parkway
Malvern, PA 19355
As avionics systems become more complex, realistic qualification requirements for the flight-critical systems become more important, but more difficult to define. Requirements developed to establish acceptable levels of performance must be verifiable if they are to have any meaning. This article shows that both the current FAA requirements of flight-critical systems and the FAA recommended methods for probabilistic assessment are flawed, and result in "required" safety assessments which are misleading. Alternatives are then explored.
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